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In Part 1 of “The Dynamic Impact of
Fundamental Tax Reform,” we described a few
of the proposals for moving to a consumption-
based taxation system. Advocates of this type of
tax reform cite two advantages. First, it would
simplify the tax code by imposing a single con-
sumption tax rate and eliminating many of the
deductions and exemptions that exist in the cur-
rent tax scheme. This simplification, in turn,
would reduce compliance and enforcement
costs and thereby make the tax collection sys-
tem more efficient. Second, by shifting from an
income-based to a consumption-based tax, this
reform would increase the incentive to save and
invest, as opposed to consume. These incentive
effects could lead to a subsequent increase in
growth. Our emphasis is more on the second of
these claimed advantages, as we focus on the
aggregate economic effects of tax reform.
The economic models presented here dif-
fer from the model described in Part 1 in that
they allow for variable work effort—not just a
variable capital stock. This change adds sub-
stantial realism to our analysis and brings it into
closer conformity with the efforts of others.
1 We
ignore international capital flows, earnings
uncertainty, and investment in training and 
education—each of which may be quantita-
tively important.
Our results suggest that if tax reform is to
be successful in stimulating investment and rais-
ing long-run living standards, then it is im-
portant that ways be found to keep the
consumption tax rate at or below the current
rate of labor-income taxation. Like labor-income
taxes, consumption taxes distort labor-market
decisions. Consequently, a consumption tax
imposed at a high rate may be worse than a
low-rate income tax; the additional labor-market
distortion caused by the consumption tax may
undo the positive economic effects of the cut in
the rate of capital-income taxation.
In this article we first describe the nature
of preferences and technology in our economy.
We then show how eliminating the existing
labor and capital taxes and replacing them with
a consumption tax would affect such variables
as capital, employment, and interest rates.
These results generally hold true for a wide
range of economies. We also illustrate how 
various configurations of tax rates, preferences,
and technology could alter the economy’s
response to tax reform. For example, we
demonstrate that the economy’s immediate
response to tax reform is muted—and the over-
all adjustment process is substantially prolonged
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Our results suggest that if 
tax reform is to be successful 
in stimulating investment 
and raising long-run living
standards, then it is important
that ways be found to keep the
consumption tax rate at 
or below the current rate of
labor-income taxation.20
their stocks of plant and equipment. The reader
interested primarily in these illustrations may
wish to focus on the section entitled “Some
Specific Examples,” which contains these re-
sults. Also, in the box entitled “Growth Effects”
we describe circumstances under which tax
reform might have a permanent impact on the
economy’s growth rate.
DESCRIPTION OF THE ECONOMY
It is useful to consider and analyze tax
reforms within a concrete economic model. In
particular, we describe a few variants of neo-
classical growth models used to analyze issues
in dynamic economies, such as growth or busi-
ness cycles. For the most part, we abstract from
issues related to sustained growth by assuming
that the trend growth rate is determined exoge-
nously. In this case, all quantitative results
should be interpreted as deviations from some
trend growth rate. For convenience we also
abstract from any uncertainty.
It is useful, but by no means necessary, to
assume that the total tax bill is paid by house-
holds. We show in the box entitled “The Equiva-
lence of Tax Regimes” that this assumption is
actually not inconsistent with a world in which
the firms pay corporate profits taxes. Effectively,
the household tax bill in our model includes
what in reality is a corporate tax. This is a use-
ful simplification.
The Consumer’s Problem
We consider an environment in which all
households are identical so that we may abstract
from the distributional consequences of tax
reform. This assumption allows us to carry out
our analysis in per-capita terms. To facilitate the
study of the different tax regimes, we first pre-
sent an analysis of the economy in the presence
of capital and labor taxation. We then show
how the introduction of a consumption tax
changes the decisions of households and firms.
We assume that households have identical
preferences characterized by the following util-
ity function:
Here ct and nt represent the amount of con-
sumption and employment in period t.
Additionally,  r represents the households’ pure
rate of time preference. We assume that each
household has one unit of time that can be used
for either work or leisure and that the house-
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sumption good (ct) and leisure (1 – nt). More-
over, we assume that there is a capital tax rate
of tp and a labor tax rate of tw.
2 At date t, the
typical household has kt units of capital, which
is rented to the typical firm. The households
have budget constraints that are written as
(1) ct + Dkt £ (1 – tw)wtnt + (1 – tp)rt¢kt + ht.
The right side of this equation represents
after-tax income. The left side represents con-
sumption plus saving in the form of investment
in new capital. Here rt¢ is the pretax return to
capital, net of depreciation, that is paid to
households for the capital rented by the firm.
3
The household pays tax on this capital income
and consequently receives (1 – tp)rt¢ units of
after-tax income per unit of capital. Similarly, wt
is the pretax wage paid by firms, and (1 – tw)wt
is the after-tax wage paid to workers. It is
assumed that capital used by the firm depreci-
ates at the rate d per period. The term Dkt refers
to the change in the capital stock that results
from period-t investment. Lastly, ht represents a
lump-sum transfer payment from the govern-
ment, which includes all revenue derived from
government taxation.
4
In each period, households must make
decisions concerning how much to work and
invest. Having made these decisions, the level
of consumption is determined by default from
Equation 1. The employment decision by con-
sumers must satisfy the following equation:
(2) (1 – tw)wtU1(ct,1 – nt) = U2(ct,1 – nt),
where Ui(•) denotes the marginal utility with
respect to the i ’th argument. Equation 2 states
that the marginal return from working an extra
hour, calculated in units of utility and taking
taxes into account, must equal the marginal
disutility from doing so.
The optimality condition that characterizes
the investment decision takes the form
This condition states that the marginal
after-tax return to investing another unit, calcu-
lated in terms of utility, must just equal the mar-
ginal cost of giving up one unit of consumption.
The Firm’s Problem
We assume there are many identical 
firms. Each firm has access to a technology for
producing the consumption good, written as
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Growth Effects
Supporters of the move to a consumption-based taxation system
argue that one of the benefits of such a system is that it would
increase the economy’s growth rate.There are legitimate reasons for
this view. A consumption tax would deter individuals from consuming
and eliminate the present distortion in the capital-income tax, which
discourages saving or investment. In other words, this investment
would increase the capital stock, which would, in turn, increase the
future level of output. Furthermore, the removal of taxation on capital
income makes it even more rewarding to invest in capital, because the
return would be higher.1
The welfare consequences of these growth effects could be sub-
stantial.That is, economic agents would be willing to pay a lot to
receive the benefits from a relatively small increase in the growth rate.
Before quantifying this effect, it is also important to acknowledge
factors that may mitigate it. First, some forms of capital investment are
already subject to (relatively) favorable tax treatment. Investment in
housing is already encouraged through interest deductibility and
reduced capital-gains taxation. Additionally, some forms of investment
in human capital are already treated favorably.
To give some content to this analysis, it is useful to consider a
model of endogenous growth in which the equilibrium growth rate is
determined by the economic decisions of agents.To illustrate the
potential growth benefits from eliminating the capital-income tax, con-
sider the simple economy below in which employment is held fixed.
Suppose that all agents have preferences given as
where (1/s) > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and is
assumed to be a fixed parameter. Here ct represents consumption in
period t. Labor does not enter either the utility or production functions.
The technology for the economy can be written as 
ct + kt+1 = Ztkt
q,
where kt is the capital stock in period t and Zt the technology shock in
period t. Implicitly, we assume a 100 percent depreciation rate and that
Zt is a function of the average capital stock in the economy. In particu-
lar, if Kt is the average capital stock, then Zt = AKt
1–q.The logic behind
this specification is that an agent’s productivity is positively influenced
by the capital or investment undertaken by other agents in the econ-
omy.This specification can be justified in that some firms or individuals
are more productive if there are other firms or individuals with high lev-
els of human or physical capital. For example, manufacturers of auto-
mobiles or televisions can make a better product if they also have
access to better electronic or microchip technology. Similarly, research
scientists as well as various organizations or coalitions of agents (foot-
ball players, for example) are more productive if they can work along-
side other productive individuals.
An analysis of this economy shows that the growth rate g is
This equation illustrates that the growth rate is related to parameters
r, q, and A. In particular, the smaller r is, the larger the level of saving
or investment will be and, consequently, the higher the growth rate will
be. Similarly, the higher q or A is, the greater the incentive to save or
invest will be, and the higher the growth rate will be. However, the
higher the tax rate, the lower the return to investment, and therefore
the lower the growth rate will be.Table 1 gives some examples of the
growth rates for output that result for various parameter values.
In this economy, we can show that the return to a unit of extra
investment is Aq(1 – tp). Hence, a higher tax rate reduces the after-tax
return to investment. In this model, the rate of return to investment is






































When the capital-income tax is replaced by a consumption tax,
the growth rate formula given above reduces to
The rate of return to investment is then written as qA. Hence both the
growth rate and the rate of return are higher with the consumption tax
than with the capital tax.
Generally, in any model in which agents have the preferences as
given by Equation B.1, the net after-tax rate of return on investment (r)
and the growth rate are linked by the following: g = (1/s) log[r/(1 + r)].
Thus, any policy that raises the growth rate g of the economy is also
likely to raise the after-tax rate of return to investment.That is, it is
incompatible to simultaneously have high growth rates and low rates 
of return. Of course, this relationship also implies that if s is small,
then there are potentially large growth effects that can be derived from
policies that raise the rate of return to investment.
This example and the results presented in Table 1 suggest that
eliminating capital-income taxation would have a substantial impact on
the economy’s growth rate. In fact, the results contained in the table
almost certainly exaggerate the potential impact of tax reform. More-
over, it should be noted that this framework abstracts from some other
features that can be of substantial import. For example, there is no
human capital in the model, and it could be argued that reducing the
rate of taxation on human capital is at least as important as that of
physical capital. Stokey and Rebelo (1995) and Lucas (1990) study a
model that has human and physical capital and analyze the impact
that reductions in the capital-income tax rate can have on the econ-
omy.2 Given some reasonable parameterizations for their model econ-
omy, they find that there is little reason to think that this type of tax
reform would significantly increase the growth rate of aggregate out-
put.The reasoning appears to be that although physical capital is an
important ingredient in the production process, human capital is even
more important.The impact of policies that could facilitate or encour-
age capital accumulation is always important in promoting growth.
However, it is perhaps more important to promote the accumulation 
of human capital if the goal is to increase the growth rate of aggregate
output. Nevertheless, these models imply that the impact on welfare of
reducing the rate of capital-income taxation can be fairly substantial,
even if the impact on growth is small.
NOTES
1 There are also other models, sometimes referred to as the neoclassical growth
models, in which the asymptotic growth rates are independent of the tax rate
on capital. However, the framework specified in this box is not a model of this
type.
2 Cassou and Lansing (1996) conduct a related experiment. Within the context 
of a model that includes both human and physical capital, they analyze how
moving from a progressive income tax regime to one with a flat tax rate on
income would affect the equilibrium growth rate.Their quantitative results hinge
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f (kt,  nt), using capital and employment. The
typical firm maximizes profits, which are given as
f (kt, nt) – wtnt – (rt¢ + d)kt.
Written in this manner, profits are calculated in
units of the consumption good. This formula-
tion allows the firm’s problem to be written
without any tax parameters. Profit maximization
dictates that the firm must equate the marginal
product of labor to the real wage rate:
(4) f2(kt, nt) = wt.
The optimization condition for the choice
of capital requires that the marginal product of
capital equal the marginal cost of capital. This
condition is formally written as
(5) f1(kt, nt) – d = rt¢.
A Consumption Tax
Now consider the elimination of the 
capital and labor taxes and the replacement of
them with a consumption tax. The beauty of 
the formulation presented above is that the
firm’s problem is not changed by this tax
reform. However, the budget constraint for 
the individual consumers is changed from Equa-
tion 1 to
(6) ct £ [rt¢kt + wtnt – Dkt + ht](1 – t).
Here t is the consumption tax rate, calcu-
lated so that tax revenue is divided by the con-
sumption base inclusive of the amount of the
tax.
5 Clearly, Equation 6 says that consumption
will equal the after-tax value of income, less
investment or saving.
The optimization condition for employ-
ment is then determined as 
(1 – t)wtU1(ct, 1 – nt) = U2(ct, 1 – nt).
Working an extra unit produces wt units of
income (measured in real units). However, this
extra revenue purchases only (1 – t)wt units of
extra consumption since the consumption tax
must be paid on such purchases. It should be
noted that a comparison of this last equation
with Equation 2 reveals that the effects of the
labor and consumption taxes on the optimality
condition for employment are identical. Both of
these taxes work to discourage work effort and
consumption and instead encourage the agents
to take more leisure. The optimization condition
for capital accumulation is written as
Compare this equation with Equation 3,
U c n U c n r t t t t t 1 1 1 1 1 1
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which is the counterpart with the tax on capital.
As can be seen, there is now no tax on the
return to capital.
We now focus on the analytical or quali-
tative details of the tax reform. We show how
various variables respond—in both the short
and long run—to the change in tax rates. This
analysis is inherently detailed because of the
complex nature of the equilibrium responses of
so many variables. The reader interested pri-
marily in the quantitative illustrations of this
experiment may skip the following sections and
go directly to “Some Specific Examples.”
TAX REFORM IN AN ECONOMY WITH ENDOGENOUS
LABOR SUPPLY: THE GENERAL CASE
In Part 1, in which we assumed the labor
supply to be exogenously fixed, we found that
we could trace paths of consumption and the
capital stock through time using a simple phase
diagram. Here we discuss how the results pre-
sented in Part 1 must be modified if households
can choose the number of hours they work.
Labor Market Equilibrium
Equation 2 can be rearranged to give the
supply price of labor as a function of the tax
rate on labor income and the marginal rate of
substitution between leisure and consumption:
(7) w = MRS(1 – n, c)/(1 – tw),
where MRS(1 – n, c) º U2(c, 1 – n)/U1(c, 1 – n).
It is standard to assume that leisure and con-
sumption are both normal goods or, equiva-
lently, that the marginal rate of substitution is
decreasing in its first argument and increasing in
its second.
6 Equation 7 then implicitly defines a
labor-supply function. The supply price of labor
is increasing in the quantity of labor supplied, in
consumption, and in the tax rate on labor
income. In Figure 1, the labor-supply schedule
is upward sloping for given values of c and tw.
We assume that the production function
f (•,•) exhibits constant returns to scale and is
increasing in both capital and labor. Then
Equation 4 implies that the demand price of
labor is a decreasing function of the number of
hours per worker and an increasing function of
the amount of capital per worker. In Figure 1,
the labor-demand curve is negatively sloped for
any given capital stock k.
Equilibrium in the labor market must
occur at a point like A, where the labor-supply
and labor-demand curves intersect. Of course,
point A represents only a partial equilibrium in
the labor market, since the level of consumptionFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       23 ECONOMIC REVIEW  SECOND QUARTER 1998
(which was held constant when we drew the
labor-supply schedule) is not predetermined in
our economy. As the level of consumption
increases, the labor-supply schedule shifts
upward, moving point A to the northwest along
the labor-demand curve. Intuitively, households
want more leisure to accompany their increased
consumption. Increases in tw also shift the
labor-supply schedule upward, moving point A
back along the labor-demand curve. In this
instance the higher tax penalizes work effort,
which results in a fall in labor supply. By con-
trast, increases in the capital stock shift the
labor-demand schedule proportionately to the
right, moving point A to the northeast, along the
labor-supply schedule.
In summary, equilibrium hours are increas-
ing in the capital stock and decreasing in both
consumption and the tax rate:
(8) n = f(k, c, tw),
with f1 > 0 and f2, f3 < 0. Because the labor-
supply schedule is upward sloping, equilibrium
employment varies less than in proportion to
the capital stock. Formally, f1/(n/k) < 1. By
using Equation 8 to eliminate hours of work
from our model, we can construct a diagram
helpful for analyzing how consumption and the
capital stock vary through time in response to
tax reform.
The Dynamics of Capital and Consumption
Capital. Output is either consumed by
households or the government, or is channeled
into capital investment: f (k,n) = c + g + i. It 
follows that net investment, Dk, will be positive
if, and only if, c < f (k,n) – g – dk. The identical
condition held in Part 1. There, hours of work
were fixed. Here, we can substitute from
Equation 8 to obtain
(9) Dk > 0 Û c < f [k, f(k, c, tw)] – g – dk.
For given levels of government purchases
and the labor-income tax rate, the equation 
c =  f [k,  f(k,  c,  tw)] – g – dk gives those combi-
nations of capital and consumption that are sus-
tainable in the sense that they are consistent
with an unchanging capital stock. Much as in
Part 1, an increase in the capital stock will
increase sustainable consumption, provided that
the net marginal product of capital, f1 – d, is
positive.
7 In Figure 2, the schedule labeled “Dk
= 0” is upward sloping over the relevant range.
However, whereas in Part 1 the sustainable level
of consumption was independent of tax policy,
now an increase in the labor-income tax rate
reduces the representative household’s willing-
ness to work, shifting the Dk = 0 schedule
downward.
Consumption. If we assume that the house-
hold utility function is additively separable
between consumption and leisure, then the
marginal rate of substitution between consump-
tion today and consumption tomorrow will
depend only upon the levels of consumption
today and tomorrow. If we further assume that
current and future consumption are normal
goods, Equation 3 says that consumption will be
rising over time if, and only if, the after-tax
return on capital exceeds the rate of time pref-
erence:
Dc > 0 Û (1 – tp)r ¢ > r.
Using Equation 5 to eliminate the return
on capital:
(10) Dc > 0 Û (1 – tp)[f1(k, n) – d] > r.
The same condition held in Part 1. However,
now that hours are endogenous rather than
fixed, we must substitute from Equation 8 to
eliminate employment from Equation 10. This
substitution yields
(11) Dc > 0 Û (1 – tp)[f1(k, f(k, c, tw)) – d] > r.
Figure 1
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For given tax rates, the equation (1 – tp)
[f1(k, f(k, c, tw)) – d] = r gives those combina-
tions of capital and consumption that are 
consistent with an unchanging level of con-
sumption. As noted above, although equilib-
rium hours are increasing in the capital stock,
hours rise less than in proportion to capital
(f1/(n/k) < 1). It follows that k/f is increasing
in the capital stock and, hence, f1(k, f(k, c, tw))
is decreasing in the capital stock. We also know
that households like to accompany a higher
level of consumption with additional leisure 
(f2 < 0). Therefore, k/f is increasing in con-
sumption, and f1(k, f(k, c, tw)) is decreasing in
consumption. Since the marginal product of
capital is decreasing in both k and c, the equa-
tion (1 – tp)[f1(k, f(k, c, tw)) – d] = r traces out
a downward-sloping schedule in k ´ c space. In
Figure 3, this schedule is labeled “Dc = 0.” To
the right (above) the schedule, the after-tax rate
of return on capital is less than the rate of time
preference, and consumption falls through time.
To the left of (below) this curve, the after-tax
rate of return on capital is high enough that
households are willing to defer consumption.
Hence consumption rises over time.
Just as in the case in which hours of work
are exogenously fixed, a cut in the capital-
income tax rate shifts the Dc = 0 curve to the
right. However, changes in the labor-income tax
rate also shift the Dc = 0 curve. In particular, a
cut in the labor-income tax rate increases the
supply of labor, which tends to increase the
marginal product of capital. To offset this
increase, the capital stock (or consumption)
must rise. In other words, the Dc = 0 curve now
shifts to the right (upward) in response to a cut
in tw, much as it shifts to the right in response
to a cut in tp.
Capital and Consumption, Combined. Figure
4 combines the information in Figures 2 and 3.
Arrows show the direction of movement for the
different combinations of consumption and cap-
ital. The economy has a unique steady state—
point E—at which consumption and capital are
both constant. Point E is a saddle-path equilib-
rium: for each initial capital stock there is a
unique optimal level of consumption. In the
diagram, if the economy starts at capital stock 
kA < kE, then households choose consumption
level cA < cE and, over time, the economy fol-
lows the dotted path from point A toward point
E. Similarly, if the economy starts at capital
stock kB > kE, then households choose con-
sumption level cB >cE and the economy follows
the dotted path from point B toward point E.
The Effects of Tax Reform
We can use our phase diagram developed
above to analyze the effects of fundamental tax
reform on the time paths of consumption and
the capital stock. First, capital-income taxes are
eliminated, with no change in the labor-income
tax rate.
8 Then, we briefly consider how the
analysis would change if it were possible to
lower the labor-income tax rate or necessary to
raise it.
A Constant Labor-Income Tax Rate. We
assume that the economy begins in a steady-
state equilibrium in which both labor income
and capital income are taxed. In Figure 5, this
steady state is point E. Suddenly, the tax on cap-
ital income is eliminated. Suppose that the
labor-income tax rate is unchanged. (As a prac-
tical matter, most reform proposals call for the
elimination of enough tax loopholes so that the
labor-income tax rate would, in fact, remain
roughly constant.) In this case, the Dk = 0 curve
remains fixed, while the Dc = 0 schedule shifts
unambiguously to the right. It follows that the
economy’s steady state must shift to the north-
east: in our diagram, the new steady state is at
point E¢. Just as in an economy with exoge-
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fundamental tax reform is to raise both con-
sumption and the capital stock.
In the short run, the aggregate capital
stock is fixed and the interest rate adjusts to
eliminate any excess demand for capital. Con-
sumption, by contrast, is free to jump when tax
reform goes into effect. As shown in Figure 5,
consumption must jump downward to put the
economy on the saddle path leading to E¢: the
immediate effect of tax reform is to move the
economy from point E to point A¢. Thus, here—
as in an economy with exogenously fixed labor
hours—the immediate effect of fundamental
tax reform is a decrease in consumption. Then,
as capital gradually accumulates, the economy
follows the saddle path from A to E¢.
Figure 6 illustrates the labor market’s
response to tax reform. The initial equilibrium is
at point E. When tax reform first goes into
effect, we know that consumption falls (from 
cE to  cA¢) while the capital stock remains
unchanged. The fall in consumption implies a
rightward shift in the labor-supply schedule.
Intuitively, by working harder, households can
prevent consumption from falling by as much as
would otherwise be necessary. The fact that the
capital stock is initially unchanged means that
the labor-demand curve is also initially
unchanged. In Figure 6, therefore, the economy
moves from point E to point A¢: work effort
increases and the real wage falls. Through time,
as consumption and the capital stock gradually
increase, the labor-supply schedule shifts to the
left and the labor-demand schedule shifts to 
the right. Indeed, since consumption eventually
rises above its initial steady-state level, the
labor-supply schedule ends up to the left of its
original position. In the new steady state, the
real wage is clearly higher than it was originally.
Whether work effort rises or falls relative to the
initial steady state is ambiguous. In Figure 6, the
new steady state is at point E¢.
In Part 1, we showed that replacing the
current income tax system with a consumption
tax causes the after-tax return on capital to jump
upward in the short run. Indeed, it is this
jump—the result of the elimination of the cor-
porate income tax—that induces households to
defer consumption. Gradually, as the capital
stock increases, the after-tax return on capital
falls back to its original level. This pattern of
movement in the after-tax return on capital also
holds in an economy with endogenous work
effort. Indeed, the initial upward jump in the
after-tax return is even greater than in an econ-
omy with fixed work effort. The after-tax return
on capital rises not only because of the elimi-
nation of the corporate income tax, but also
because people initially respond to tax reform
by working harder, thereby raising the marginal
product of capital. As capital accumulates, the
marginal product of capital falls, and the after-
tax return on capital approaches its original
level. Whether the new steady-state capital
stock is above or below what it would have
been with a fixed labor supply is ambiguous,
since it depends upon whether work effort rises
or falls in steady state.
Tax Reform When the Labor-Income Tax Rate
Changes. Until now, we have assumed that the
labor-income tax rate is unchanged following
tax reform. If this assumption is invalid, the
economy’s response to tax reform may be
markedly different from that described above.
If, for example, eliminating the capital-income
tax requires that the tax rate applicable to labor
income be increased, then the Dc = 0 schedule
in Figure 5 will not shift quite so far to the right
following tax reform and, in extreme cases,
might actually shift to the left. Moreover, the 
Figure 5
Consumption Drops in Response to 
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Dk = 0 schedule shifts downward. Conse-
quently, it is quite possible for the postreform
steady-state level of consumption to be lower
than the prereform level of consumption.
Whether the steady-state level of capital rises or
falls is also ambiguous.
If the labor-income tax rate is lower
postreform than it is prereform, then the Dc = 0
schedule in Figure 5 will shift strongly to the
right, and the Dk = 0 schedule will shift up. For
some parameterizations, the latter effect is so
strong that consumption itself actually jumps
upward rather than downward immediately fol-
lowing tax reform. Additional, more gradual
increases in consumption follow as the econ-
omy moves along the saddle path leading to the
new steady state. The steady-state capital stock
necessarily increases.
9
Review and Outlook. We have seen that the
qualitative effects of tax reform in an economy
with endogenous work effort differ little from
those in an economy in which labor effort is
fixed—provided that the tax rate on labor
income is unchanged. The most important 
difference between the fixed-effort and the 
variable-effort cases is that with fixed effort,
households must cut back on consumption if
they wish to increase their saving, whereas with
variable effort, households have the option of
increasing their saving by cutting back on
leisure. Typically, households will choose to cut
both leisure and consumption immediately fol-
lowing tax reform.
If tax reform is to be successful in stimu-
lating investment and raising long-run living
standards, then it is critical that ways be found
to avoid increasing the rate of labor-income tax-
ation. Increases in the labor-income tax rate can
negate the positive economic effects of cuts in
the capital-income tax rate. Conversely, cuts in
the labor-income tax rate reinforce savings
incentives and contribute to higher steady-state
levels of consumption.
Specific illustrations of the effects of tax
reform are provided below for a variety of
assumptions about the new labor-income tax
rate. We also simulate the effects of tax reform
on an economy in which each firm finds it
expensive to make rapid changes to its capital
stock, and in one in which each firm finds that
the larger the capital stocks held by others, the
more productive its capital becomes.
SOME SPECIFIC EXAMPLES
To obtain quantitative estimates of the
short- and long-run consequences of tax reform,
it is necessary that we adopt some precise 
specifications for preferences and technology.
Accordingly, consider an economy in which
agents’ preferences are determined by the util-
ity function
(12) U(ct, 1 – nt) = log(ct) + log(1 – nt),
and in which aggregate output is determined
according to the following technology:




The parameter d will continue to denote the
depreciation rate of capital. It is useful to con-
sider an economy in which a period is a quar-
ter and the parameter values are r = 0.01, q =
0.35, and d = 0.02. These specifications imply
that the annual average real interest rate is
about 4 percent and that the annual deprecia-
tion rate is approximately 8 percent. They also
imply that capital’s share of aggregate income is
35 percent, which is approximately what it is in
the data. Lastly, they imply that in the model
with the current levels of taxation imposed,
individuals spend approximately one-third of
their available time working, which would
appear to be an acceptable prediction.
It is useful to look at a few experiments in
which the labor and capital tax rates are elimi-
nated and replaced with a consumption tax.
Consider first an economy that initially has an
effective capital tax rate of 35 percent and a
labor tax rate of 35 percent. Assume that this
economy is in its steady state. We arbitrarily
assume that the tax reform is implemented in
period 1. That is, during this period, the capital
and labor taxes are eliminated and the con-
sumption tax is implemented at a 35 percent
rate.
10
Figure 7 illustrates the impact of the
reform on the capital stock, employment, con-
sumption, and the after-tax interest rate (rate of
return to capital). In these figures the ´ denotes
the initial level of the variable. As can be seen,
the tax reform leads to an increase in invest-
ment, which produces a subsequent increase in
the capital stock. This increase raises the wage
rate in the economy, which leads to a substan-
tial increase in the employment level. The
increased investment is partially financed by a
decrease in consumption that occurs concur-
rently with the tax reform. Although consump-
tion falls, it subsequently grows to its new
steady-state level, surpassing its previous level
after four and one-half years.
11 Additionally, the
after-tax return to capital rises because of the
reform, but subsequently falls.
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reform levels of some variables with their result-
ing values after they have converged to the 
new steady state, even though this convergence
takes a long time. After the reform, employment
increases 3 percent. Moreover, since both the
capital stock and employment have risen, aggre-
gate output rises 12.6 percent. Wages, or the
marginal product of labor, rise by 9.4 percent.
12
Some concern exists that eliminating the
existing income and payroll taxes may require a
tax rate higher than 35 percent on consumption.
Figure 8 shows the responses of variables to a
tax reform requiring a consumption tax rate of
45 percent.
13 As can be seen, the responses are
more pronounced than those in Figure 7.
Consumption falls substantially more in the
short run and never recovers its original level.
Similarly, employment initially rises but then
falls below the original level. As a result of the
reform, the capital stock grows—although not
as much as it does in Figure 7 because of the
comparatively high tax rate. An unfortunate by-
product of this type of reform is that aggregate
output exhibits a substantial fall of about 2.6
percent at the time of the reform and only
recovers to surpass its prereform level after
eight years. Therefore, one should not assume
that all tax reforms that entail a movement to a
consumption-based tax system must immedi-
ately increase aggregate output.
It is interesting to compare the resulting
values of some important aggregates for prere-
form and postreform tax regimes with this
higher consumption tax. After the reform,
employment  decreases 7.8 percent. Since the
capital stock rises and employment falls, aggre-
gate output rises only 0.8 percent. Wages rise
9.4 percent.
As evident in each of these examples, the
economy converges to a new steady state, but
this convergence does not take place overnight.
It is relatively complete after 50 periods, or
about 12 years.
It is also useful to consider one last ex-
periment. Suppose that the technology is such
that there are adjustment costs to accumulating
Figure 7
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(15) Pt = [1 + 2(kt+1 – kt)](1 – t).
Along a path where the capital stock is
growing (that is, (kt+1 – kt) > 0) the price of 
capital will be greater than (1 – t), because the
adjustment costs impede the accumulation of
capital by making it more costly, relative to con-
suming. Conversely, along a path where the
capital stock is declining, the price of capital
will be below (1 – t).
Figure 9 also shows the path of the price
of capital. This path reflects the value or price
of a unit of capital, measured in units of the
consumption good. This price is 0.75 in the
equilibrium with the old tax system, assuming 
a dividend tax rate of 25 percent.
16 With no
adjustment costs, the price would immediately
fall to 0.65 after the tax reform. This reflects 
the fact that a unit of capital is worth only this
fraction of a unit of the consumption good since
the consumption tax must be paid out of the
proceeds. With adjustment costs, the imposition
capital—that is, costs that inhibit the accumu-
lation of capital too quickly. These costs are
captured by altering the production technology
as follows:
(14) f (kt, nt) = k
q
t nt
1–q – (kt+1 – kt)
2. 
The quadratic term in this constraint
reflects a penalty for accumulating capital too
quickly.
14 Assume that the preferences are given
by Equation 12. Again, we consider eliminating
the labor and capital tax rates and replacing
them with a consumption tax of 35 percent.
Compare these results in Figure 9 with those in
Figure 7. Because of the adjustment costs, the
accumulation of capital and the growth in con-
sumption are much slower. As a result of the
slow responses of investment and capital,
employment also does not respond as dramati-
cally to the tax reform.
The  real price of capital, measured in
units of the consumption good, is
15
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of the consumption tax would cause the price
of capital to fall, but not as dramatically. The
need to augment the capital stock, in the pres-
ence of the adjustment costs, leads to a price 
for the capital stock that is higher than it would
be otherwise. Nevertheless, because of the
accumulation of capital, this price falls slowly 
as the economy converges to its new steady
state. It is possible to increase the price of 
capital by multiplying the squared term in
Equation 14 by a coefficient that is greater than
unity. If capital adjustment costs are sufficiently
high, it is possible that the tax reform would
temporarily increase the price of capital because
the adjustment costs have this effect. However,
this increase is only temporary and the price of 
capital must subsequently fall.
FINAL REMARKS
We have presented a fairly standard
dynamic framework within which the effects of
tax reform can be studied. This framework
allows for variable work effort as well as a vari-
able capital stock. Using it, we show that mov-
ing from an income-based tax system to a
consumption-based tax system can be expected
to stimulate savings, investment, and work
effort in the short run and lead to an increased
capital stock and, ultimately, a higher standard
of living in the long run. A key assumption is
that the postreform rate of consumption taxa-
tion does not exceed the current rate of labor-
income taxation. Since consumption spending is
less than income, keeping the consumption tax
rate at or below the current rate of labor-income
taxation will generally require either that exist-
ing tax loopholes be eliminated or that existing
government programs be cut. If the tax rate
assumption is violated, the disincentive to work
may be strengthened as a result of tax reform—
potentially strengthened to the extent that con-
sumption never recovers its prereform level. In
extreme cases, the capital stock may actually
Figure 9
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decline over time rather than increase following
the adoption of a consumption tax.
For reasonable assumptions about tax
rates, the real price of capital falls as a result of
tax reform. When individual firms are able to
costlessly adjust their capital stocks, the entire
price decline is immediate. Otherwise, some
fraction of the decline occurs gradually as the
economy approaches its new steady state. The
after-tax return to capital is likely to shoot up
even more in an economy with variable-labor
effort than in an economy with fixed-labor
effort.
NOTES
We are grateful to Carlos Zarazaga for his comments
and suggestions.
1 See Becsi (1993), Wynne (1997), and, especially,
Cooley and Hansen (1992). Like these authors, we 
use a representative agent, infinite-horizon model. 
For alternative approaches, see Engen, Gravelle, and
Smetters (1997) or Joint Committee on Taxation (1997).
2 This notation is consistent with that in Part 1, where tw
and tp are the income tax rates applicable to wages
and corporate profits, respectively. Interest and divi-
dend income was taxed at the rate td in our earlier
article. But changes in td have no effect on the behav-
ior of agents, so we drop it from the model presented
here. The price of capital is affected by td, however,
and when we discuss the price of capital, we assume
that td = 0.25 under the current income tax. See the
box entitled “The Equivalence of Tax Regimes.’’
3 The after-tax interest rate, r, in Part 1 is related to r¢ by
the formula r = (1 – tp)r¢.
4 It could alternatively be assumed that the government
revenue is thrown away. However, changing the tax
rate would then mean that the government is chang-
ing the amount of its consumption. The approach
adopted here permits us to focus exclusively on 
the substitution effects produced by the presence 
of the taxes.
5 This approach makes it easy to compare the con-
sumption tax rate with current income tax rates, since
the latter are defined as tax revenue divided by the
tax-inclusive income. An alternative way to write this
budget constraint is (1 + t*)ct + Dkt £ r ¢ tkt + wtnt + ht.
It is easily shown that t = [t*/(1 + t*)], so that t £ t*.
6 For example, for the preferences given below by
Equation 12, it is easy to show that MRS(1 – n,c) =
c/(1 – n). A good is said to be “normal’’ if a relaxation
of the household budget constraint, with no change 
in relative prices, leads to an increased demand for
the good.
7 Formally, ¶c/¶k = (f1 – d + f2f1)/(1 – f2f2). For ¶c/¶k > 0,
it is sufficient that f1 – d > 0.
8 A consumption tax can be implemented by combining
a wage tax with a tax on a firm’s cash flow. (This
approach is advocated by Hall and Rabushka 1995.)
The cash flow tax is nondistortional, so we can ignore
it when tracing the economy’s response to tax reform.
For our purposes, the adoption of a consumption tax is
equivalent to eliminating taxes on capital income while 
continuing to tax wage income.
9 Consider the effects of a cut in the labor-income tax
rate, holding the capital-income tax rate constant. 
(We already know how changes in tp affect the capital
The Equivalence of Tax Regimes
As stated in the article, no generality is lost by assuming that all taxes are paid
by the household. Consider a regime in which the firm pays corporate profits taxes.
We show that this regime is equivalent to another in which the household pays the
taxes.
Under a profits tax, the after-tax cash flow of a firm can be written as
pt = (1 – tp) [f(kt, nt) – wtnt – dkt] – Dkt,
assuming that all investment is financed out of retained earnings. Here tp is the tax
rate on profits, and Dkt is investment financed out of retained earnings of the firm.
The optimization condition for profit maximization implied by choosing the optimal
employment level is
f2(kt, nt) = wt.
The optimization condition for profit maximization implied by optimal capital
accumulation is that the firm equate the after-tax return to investment with the rate of
return.This can be written as 
(A.1) (1 – tp)f1(kt, nt) = rt ,
where rt is the after-tax rate of return.That is, the consumer will still have to pay a
dividend tax if these earnings are distributed to him as dividends.The profit function
above can be equivalently written as1
(A.2) pt = (1 – tp) [f1(kt, nt) – d]kt – Dkt.
The budget constraint for the agent can be written as
(A.3) ct £ (1 – tw)wtnt + (1 – td)pt + ht.
This equation means that the wealth or income for the individual to consume con-
sists of labor income plus the value of the dividends paid by the firm.These divi-
dends consist of the profit from the current period, net of taxes paid and investment
undertaken by the firm. Combining Equations A.1 and A.2 with A.3 produces
(A.4) ct + Dkt(1 – td) £ (1 – tw)wtnt + rtkt(1 – td) + ht
or
(A.5) ct + Dkt¢ £ (1 – tw)wtnt + (1 – tp)rt¢kt¢ + ht,
where kt¢ = kt(1 – td) and rt¢ = rt /(1 – tp). Here rt¢ is the pretax return. Equation A.4
is now identical to Equation 1, with kt¢ replacing kt.The only difference is that under
this scheme, in which investment is financed through retained earnings and there 
is a dividend tax, one unit of capital equals (1 – td) units of consumption.The trans-
formation in going from Equation A.4 to Equation A.5 reflects this notion.
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stock.) Equation 11 says that the steady-state capital–
labor ratio is unaffected by a cut in tw. But if steady-
state consumption is to increase (as our phase diagram
says it must), then the steady-state levels of capital
and labor cannot both fall. Hence, both must increase.
10 As discussed in Part 1, current average marginal rates
of profit and wage taxation are approximately 35 per-
cent. A 35 percent Hall–Rabushka-style consumption
tax would be sufficient to replace the revenues raised
by the current income and payroll taxes, provided
most existing tax deductions and tax credits are elimi-
nated.
11 It should be noted that the convergence in this econ-
omy is faster in this case than if there were no labor
entering the production technology. (See the example
in Koenig and Huffman 1998). In the present case, 
the level of output can be augmented by increasing
employment, which enables the capital stock to move
more quickly to its new steady-state level. Because
households seek to smooth the path of consumption,
they are willing to work especially hard in the years
immediately following tax reform.
12 This framework does not allow the tax rate to influence
the long-term rate of growth, which is assumed to be
exogenously determined. For a simple model in which
the growth rate is influenced by the tax rate, see the
box entitled “Growth Effects.”
13 Such a high marginal tax rate might be required if the
consumption tax were accompanied by a demogrant
—a lump-sum transfer payment from the government
—or if certain categories of consumption were ex-
cluded from the tax base.
14 Unfortunately, while there is a general consensus
among economists that capital adjustment costs are
important, there is no consensus on just how big they
are. Since we have made no serious effort to calibrate
our adjustment-cost equation to real-world data, our
simulations are useful solely for what they have to say
about the qualitative impact of capital adjustment
costs on the economy’s response to tax reform.
15 Roughly speaking, with appropriate substitutions
Equation 6 can be written as ct = (1 – t)[kt
qnt
1–q + 
(1 – d)kt – (kt+1 – kt)
2 – kt+1]. Taking the total derivative
of this expression to calculate the price as –dct/dkt+1
yields Equation 15.
16 See note 2.
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